Low-Carbon Transition Index. Est 2025.
An annual independent index that digs beneath the perception to track global real-economy progress on the low-carbon transition across fourteen indicators.
The reality versus the hype.
Newsflow, fund flows and politics have created a perception of the low-carbon transition (resembling Gartner's hype cycle) that is often at odds with reality. To cut through the noise, Perigon has compiled a Low-Carbon Transition Index (LCTI) to get a clearer view of real progress.
Although absolute emissions continue to rise at a global level, the underlying picture from leading indicators is one of steady positive momentum in the energy transition since the Paris Agreement. That said, a clear acceleration in progress is required to align with the IEA's Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS).
Perigon's LCTI highlights positive direction of travel across key energy-related and enabler indicators in 2024. However, non-energy-related indicators are behind in both measures of performance.
There will be a low-carbon transition. The extent to which, and by when, we reach net zero may vary significantly across sectors and regions. Strong growth in targets and investment would support an acceleration in the LCTI, though likely still short of the required rate.
Source: Perigon Partners analysis, January 2026. Perigon's ETI comprised of seven energy-related indicators including the greening of electricity generation and increasing battery storage capacity; as well as the electrification of transport, buildings and industry; the reduction in the energy intensity of GDP and the increasing share of low carbon fuels.
Examining annual performance of the broader low-carbon transition components shows a more nuanced picture with acceleration required.
Perigon's LCTI scores fourteen indicators on direction of travel and performance relative to the pace required to align to the IEA's 2035 Stated Policies goals and its Net Zero Scenario. For non-energy indicators, we track against equivalent pathways where available. We combine directional and relative performance scores for each indicator to produce our index scores.
| Category | Sub-category | Indicator | Metric | Annual change in metric | Low-carbon Transition Index (LCTI) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Direction of travel | Relative to scenario requirement | Weighted performance | Score / 100 | |||||
| Real-economy Transition Progress Indicators | Energy-related | Green the Grid | Energy generation | CO₂ intensity of electricity generation (g CO₂ per kWh) | 64.8 | |||
| Energy storage | Battery storage capacity share of total power capacity (%) | |||||||
| Electrify everything | Transport | Electricity share of total final transport energy consumption (%) | ||||||
| Electrify everything | Buildings – Electrification | Electricity share of total final building energy consumption (%) | ||||||
| Industry | Electricity share of total final industry energy consumption (%) | |||||||
| Improve efficiency – Production | Energy intensity | Change in global primary energy intensity (energy supply to GDP) | ||||||
| Improve efficiency – Consumption | Low-carbon fuels | Sustainable fuels share of total final energy consumption (%) | ||||||
| Non-energy-related | Change land use – Land-cover | Deforestation | Rate of change in deforestation (%) | |||||
| Change land use – Diet | Dietary change | Rate of change in per capita meat consumption by type | ||||||
| Capture carbon – Nature-based | Reforestation | Rate of change in reforestation (%) | ||||||
| Capture carbon – Tech-based | Carbon capture | Rate of change in carbon capture (%) | ||||||
| Transition Enabler Indicators | Enable the transition | Commitment | Commitments and targets: % of global market cap covered by net zero commitments or targets | 66.7 | ||||
| Investment | Investment in climate transition: annual investment in energy transition ($) | |||||||
| Pricing | Carbon pricing: change in average carbon price ($/tCO₂) | |||||||
Perigon's LCTI assigns each metric a score for its performance vs. the prior year (direction of travel) and a score for that performance relative to what is required to align to the 2035 goals of the stated policies scenario (STEPS). The two scores are then combined for each metric, with a higher weighting (60%) applied to relative performance, before being aggregated into the overall real-economy and enabler scores out of 100.
Source: Perigon Partners analysis, January 2026.
Explore the research and data behind Perigon's LCTI.
We aim to provide a single, rich source of consolidated data and research to paint a clear and detailed picture of what is really happening with the global climate transition. Use this to inform your company's plans and provide context to the Board and ExCo.
Emissions are still rising globally. But the trajectory is shifting.
Global CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels reached nearly 40 billion tonnes in 2024 — yet the rate of growth has slowed by around 60% since 2010. The picture varies significantly by region, sector and income level, with high-income countries increasingly decoupling growth from emissions while China and Asia continue to drive global totals higher. The UK stands out as one of the clearest examples that deep decarbonisation and economic growth can happen at the same time.
Globally, absolute annual emissions continue to grow…
- Limiting warming within the goals of the Paris Agreement – to minimise the catastrophic impacts of climate change and the chances of triggering global tipping points – requires immediate and steep reductions in CO₂ and other greenhouse gas emissions
- Since the first international climate gathering under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1995, emissions have grown rapidly
- The pace of growth has slowed since the Paris Agreement in 2015, but ten years on, the primary source of human-caused emissions – burning fossil fuels – have yet to peak, reaching nearly 40 billion tons of CO₂ in 2024
- Excludes emissions from land-use change
Source: Hannah Ritchie (2022) – “CO₂ emissions dataset: our sources and methods” Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: ‘https://archive.ourworldindata.org/20251125-173858/co2-dataset-sources.html’ [Online Resource] (archived on November 25, 2025).
…with that growth clearly driven by China and Asia more broadly
- Whilst responsible for the majority of historical emissions, high income countries have been reducing their annual CO₂ emissions over the past 15 years
- That reduction has been more than offset by the strong growth in China’s emissions over the same period
- China and the rest of Asia (excluding India), now make up approximately half of annual emissions globally
Source: Hannah Ritchie (2022) – “CO₂ emissions dataset: our sources and methods” Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: ‘https://archive.ourworldindata.org/20251125-173858/co2-dataset-sources.html’ [Online Resource] (archived on November 25, 2025).
Emissions per capita is falling in most regions, with China and India the notable exceptions to this trend
- Emissions per capita have been relatively flat when viewed at a global level
- At a regional level, declines in the US and EU over the past 25 years have been offset by strong growth in per capita emissions in China
- Despite reductions, North America remains the most emissions-intense region
- As these emissions are domestic (not accounting for traded goods), reductions in US, Canada and Europe could be partially explained by the global shift of manufacturing to China
- Includes CO₂ emissions from burning fossil fuels and industrial processes, including: transport, electricity generation and heating. Excludes emissions from land use change
Source: Hannah Ritchie (2022) – “CO₂ emissions dataset: our sources and methods” Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: ‘https://archive.ourworldindata.org/20251125-173858/co2-dataset-sources.html’ [Online Resource] (archived on November 25, 2025).
The emissions from power generation are plateauing, even in China
- Emissions from generating electricity have plateaued at a global level over the last ten years
- Multiple regions in the world are now expected to record falling emissions from electricity generation out to 2026
- The largest decrease in terms of absolute emissions is expected in China as a result of the rapid deployment of renewable energy and rising nuclear generation
- Note these figures are highly sensitive to fluctuations in electricity demand, which can be heavily impacted by economic activity and weather conditions
¹ Ember, September 2025. Source: Hannah Ritchie (2022) – “CO₂ emissions dataset: our sources and methods” Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: ‘https://archive.ourworldindata.org/20251125-173858/co2-dataset-sources.html’ [Online Resource] (archived on November 25, 2025).
Many countries have managed to grow their economies while cutting emissions
- A significant number of countries across Europe, North America and beyond have successfully decoupled economic growth from CO₂ emissions over the 2005–2020 period
- The UK, Germany, France and most EU economies have achieved meaningful reductions in CO₂ per capita whilst growing GDP per capita
- This demonstrates that the low-carbon transition and economic growth are not mutually exclusive – though the pace and depth of decarbonisation varies significantly by country
Source: Hannah Ritchie (2022) – “CO₂ emissions dataset: our sources and methods” Published online at OurWorldInData.org.
The UK has halved its annual emissions since 1990, despite the economy growing nearly 80%
- From 1990–2022, the UK achieved a 50% reduction in annual emissions, whilst growing its economy by nearly 80%¹
- In 2024, UK’s territorial emissions² were 413.7 MtCO₂e, marking the tenth consecutive year of sustained reduction in emissions (excl. COVID-19 years 2020/2021)
- The majority of reductions have come from decarbonising industry and the electricity supply (The UK’s last coal-fired power plant closed in October 2024)
- Over 80% of the required emissions savings between now and 2030 need to come from sectors other than energy supply
- Domestic transport (including aviation) is now the largest source of annual emissions in the UK, followed by buildings and product use
¹ UK Gov. ² UK territorial emissions refer to emissions that occur within the UK border but include international aviation and shipping.
Source: UK Climate Change Commission, Seventh Carbon Budget, 2025. DESNZ (2025) Final UK greenhouse gas emissions national statistics: 1990 to 2023. DESNZ Provisional UK greenhouse gas emissions statistics 2024.
Policy, capital and commitments all moving forward.
Despite unprecedented political headwinds, the structural enablers of the low-carbon transition continued to strengthen through 2025. All 37 jurisdictions tracked by the Oxford Climate Policy Monitor increased policy ambition. Corporate science-based targets now cover over 40% of global market capitalisation. Clean energy investment reached $2.1 trillion. And under every NGFS scenario, the carbon price is set to exceed $100 per tonne by 2030.
Despite political uncertainty, 2025 saw continued climate policy strengthening…
- Despite unprecedented political attacks on climate policy, 2025 has experienced continued strengthening
- Since 2020, all 37 jurisdictions¹ tracked show increases in ambition, stringency, implementation, and comprehensiveness of the policies in force, with formal rollbacks in only one case: the United States
- Growth in rule-making activity and ambition has been particularly pronounced in rules around climate-related disclosures, carbon credits, and methane
- More incremental progress has been made on rules governing transition planning, public procurement, and green prudential standards for the financial sector
¹ Policy Monitor tracks climate rules across 37 jurisdictions – which cover over 85% of global emissions and 87% of global GDP.
Source: 2025 Oxford Climate Policy Monitor Annual Review. Oxford Climate Policy Hub, University of Oxford, November 2025.
Figure 2. Total number of policy tools in force by domain and year
*Policies approved or issued up to July 2025. Note: Policy tools may be relevant to more than one domain (e.g. considered a disclosure and transition planning tool). Therefore, the total number of policy tools mapped in the figure (n=924) is greater than the number of policy tools mapped in the 2024 Oxford Climate Policy Monitor (n=692).
…Helping to underpin growth in corporate climate commitments and targets that pave the way for future transition action
- The organic expansion of ambition demonstrates that companies worldwide are continuing to prepare for the low-carbon transition, irrespective of the policy and geopolitical volatility
- Nearly 11,000 companies have either already set greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets with the SBTi or have committed to set them
- Science-based targets now cover over 40% of global market capitalisation and a quarter of global revenue
Note: data includes SMEs and financial institutions.
Source: SBTi Trend Tracker, August 2025.
Total annual investment in the energy transition has reached $2.1 trillion
- Global investment in the energy transition hit nearly $2.1 trillion in 2024, though annual growth slowed to 11%, compared to the 22% annual average since 2020
- Mainland China has returned to the driving seat, accounting for two-thirds of the global increase seen last year
- The global clean energy supply chain saw $130 billion in new investment, despite ongoing struggles with overcapacity
- Equity and debt issuances for climate and energy transition purposes remained just above $1 trillion
- The Asia Pacific region grew fastest, at 21% year-on-year, and surpassed $1 trillion in 2024
Source: BloombergNEF, Energy Transition Investment Trends, January 2025.
Asset owners and managers expect to continue to add to sustainable AUM
- 84% of the over 900 institutional investors in Morgan Stanley’s global survey expect the proportion of sustainable assets under management in their portfolios to rise in the next two years
- Drivers are more performance- and opportunity-led rather than risk and regulatory
- Investors are increasingly concerned about a range of challenges to sustainable investing, but see sustainability as important to managing investment risk
- Energy efficiency and renewable energy remain the top two sustainable investment priorities, with climate adaptation rising to third on the list
Source: Morgan Stanley Institute for Sustainable Investing, 2025 Sustainable Signals survey, November 2025.
Substantial increase in the price of carbon expected under all NGFS transition scenarios
- The Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) short-term scenarios are clear that a well-paced implementation of effective climate policies – gradual increases in carbon prices, coupled with effective recycling of carbon tax revenues into green investments – in a globally coordinated effort, limits the negative effects of a net-zero transition
- Sudden and high carbon price, as seen in the Sudden Wake-Up Call (SWUC) scenario, would lead to a strong inflationary spike
- In all scenarios, the weighted average carbon price moves beyond $100 per tonne by 2030 – 5x the current price
Source: NGFS Short term climate scenarios, May 2025.
Every major energy indicator is moving in the right direction. The question is how fast.
Renewables now account for over 90% of new power capacity globally. Electric vehicle sales have exceeded 17 million. Battery storage is scaling rapidly. Energy intensity is falling. The direction of travel is clear and consistent. What remains uncertain is whether the current pace is sufficient: under even the less demanding IEA Stated Policies Scenario, most indicators need to accelerate meaningfully between now and 2035.
Renewables now clearly dominate annual power capacity expansion
- Renewables accounted for over 90% of total power capacity expansion in 2024, up from 85% in 2023
- Their share in the world’s total installed power capacity rose from 43% to 46% during the same period, reflecting both accelerated adoption of renewable energy and a slowdown in non-renewable capacity additions
- As the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) produced from most forms of renewable power continued to fall, renewables are not only the best choice for the environment and clean air, but also the most cost-effective power source for countries around the world
Source: IRENA, Renewables in 2024: 5 Key Facts Behind a Record-Breaking Year, April 2025.
The energy intensity of production has been decreasing steadily but needs to pick up the pace
- Global energy intensity improved by 1.2% in 2024, to reach 3.33 GJ per USD 1,000
- Whilst the energy intensity of production has been coming down, the relatively slow pace of global progress to date means the annual rate of improvement needs to nearly double to 2.2% from 2024 to 2035 in the IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS)
- In the NZE scenario a 4.1% annual improvement in energy intensity to 2035 (from 2024) is required to stay on track
Source: IEA World Energy Outlook, 2025.
Energy storage growth continues despite adverse policy shifts
- Global energy storage additions expected to grow 23% in 2025, despite adverse policy shifts and tariff challenges in the two largest markets – China and US
- Annual deployments also set to scale in Germany, UK, Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia and Sub-Saharan Africa, driven by supportive policies, procurement by utilities and power market dynamics
- To align to the IEA Stated Policy scenario (STEPS), storage capacity needs to 10x from 2024 to 2035
- BNEF expects energy storage installations to keep gaining momentum over the next decade, with cumulative capacity to reach 2 terawatts – 8x the 2025 level
Source: IEA World Energy Outlook, 2025; BloombergNEF, 2H 2025 Energy Storage Market Outlook; “Global Energy Boom: Three Things to Know”, October 2025.
Electric vehicle sales continue to expand share globally, led by China
- Electric car sales exceeded 17 million globally in 2024, reaching a sales share of more than 20%
- The additional 3.5 million electric cars sold in 2024 vs 2023 is more than the total number of electric cars sold worldwide in 2020
- China maintained its lead, with electric cars accounting for almost half of all car sales in 2024
- Electric car sales in 2025 are expected to exceed 20 million worldwide to represent more than one-quarter of cars sold worldwide
- Despite uncertainties in the outlook, the share of electric cars in overall car sales is set to exceed 40% by 2030 under today’s policy settings
Source: IEA, Global EV Outlook 2025, July 2025.
Level of electrification required varies substantially under the different IEA scenarios
- Electrification of industry, transport and buildings is a critical step that works with the greening of the grid to decarbonise energy
- The electricity share of total final energy consumption (TFC) has been increasing across the board
- While the uplift required to align to the IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) looks somewhat achievable in light of current technological advancements and momentum, the gap to the Net Zero by 2050 scenario will require significant changes in policy and adoption
Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2025.
The hardest indicators to move. And the biggest gaps.
Non-energy indicators lag furthest behind the transition pathway. Dietary change, deforestation and carbon capture all face significant shortfalls against what either the IEA STEPS or Net Zero scenario requires. Unlike energy indicators where the direction of travel is broadly positive, progress here is slow, inconsistent and in some cases barely measurable since the baseline was set.
Per capita meat consumption continues to grow globally but at a lower emissions intensity
- Per capita meat consumption has nearly doubled since 1961 and grown 20% since the turn of the century
- By type, growth has been driven by a marked increase in the consumption of poultry, from 11kg per person per year in 2000 to 17kg in 2022
- Beef consumption has actually stayed relatively flat at a global level at around 10kg/person/yr since 1961
- Beef is by far the most emissions intensive at 71kgCO₂e/kg, compared to 10kgCO₂e/kg for chicken¹
- While almost all regions have increased consumption, growth has been most marked in China, going from 69kg in 2000 to 112kg in 2022 – but still below the United States at 144kg/person/yr
Source: Our World in Data. Data source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2024).
¹ Our World in Data. Data source: Poore & Nemecek (2018), Reducing food’s environmental impacts through producers and consumers.
Lack of progress in annual deforestation rates means we are now way off track
- In 2024, global deforestation persisted despite needing a 10% annual reduction each year to 2030 to reach zero deforestation (20% reduction each year from 2025)
- The global deforestation rate in 2024 was 2% lower than the baseline (2018–2020), but 63% higher than the rate needed to achieve zero-deforestation by 2030
- We have made almost no progress in the four years since the baseline rate and are thus off track to meet this target
Source: WRI, Deforestation and Restoration Targets Tracker, May 2025.
Tracked by measuring a proxy for deforestation against a baseline average deforestation rate from 2018–2020.
Carbon capture and storage capacity deployment gaining momentum but substantial gap to 2030 remains
- Carbon Capture and Storage (CCUS) deployment has been behind expectations in the past but momentum has grown substantially in recent years, with over 700 projects in various stages of development, according to IEA
- The total amount of CO₂ that could be captured in 2030 is around 435 million tonnes (Mt) per year, rising to around 615 Mt of CO₂ per year when including announced storage capacity
- While the momentum from announcements is positive, it leaves a c. 40% gap to be filled to the c. 1 Gt CO₂ per year required in the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 (NZE) Scenario
Source: IEA Energy Systems, Carbon Capture Utilisation and Storage, April 2024.
Progress is real and measurable. But reinvention must accelerate.
Corporate commitment to the low-carbon transition has grown substantially. TPI management quality scores are improving year on year, C-suite leaders are increasing sustainability investment, and decarbonisation has moved firmly into the realm of business strategy. The direction of travel is positive across all three measures, though the pace at company level must accelerate significantly to close the gap to net zero pathways.
Corporates continue to progress in their transition journeys
- The Management Quality framework assesses 2,000 companies’ carbon management and governance practices, placing them on a scale from Level 0, ‘Unaware’, to Level 5, ‘Transition planning and implementation’
- Level 3 remains the most common company Management Quality score. Level 3 companies have a policy commitment to take action, have set an emissions reduction target and disclose their Scope 1 and 2 emissions
- Scores continue to improve, with 172 companies moving up at least one level from 2023
- Progress is evident across nearly all indicators, particularly disclosure of material Scope 3 emissions (up from 36% of companies to 49%) and climate scenario planning (from 52% to 64%)
Source: TPI, State of the Corporate Transition, September 2025.
Sustainable investments remain a core priority for global executives
- According to survey responses, sustainability remains a top three priority on the C-suite agenda, alongside technology adoption and artificial intelligence (AI)
- Leaders recognise the business case and related benefits of corporate sustainability efforts. Over the past year investments have increased, and revenue generation was the most frequently reported business benefit of sustainability actions
- Technology and artificial intelligence (AI) are key enablers, helping organisations transform their sustainability efforts to create lasting business value and a more resilient future
Source: Deloitte 2025 C-Suite Sustainability Report.
Survey of the largest 4,000 companies globally finds that decarbonisation has moved firmly into the realm of business strategy
- According to Accenture, for the world’s largest companies, the issue is not whether sustainability delivers value, but whether organisations are reinventing fast enough to maximise its benefits
- The report found that nearly 90% of companies are connecting their decarbonisation efforts to business value
- As companies are increasingly setting climate targets, the report also found that they are using a wider range of decarbonisation tools, or “levers,” to achieve their goals
- Top levers being utilised include energy efficiency, waste reduction, renewables adoption, building-related measures, and working with suppliers
Source: Accenture, Destination Net Zero 2025.
14 indicators. Two pathways.
Each indicator scored 0–100 against IEA STEPS 2035 and Net Zero pathways. Scores combine direction of travel (40% weight) and pace relative to pathway requirements (60% weight). A score of 80+ is considered on track.
| Indicator | STEPS score | Net Zero score |
|---|---|---|
| Energy | ||
| Energy generation | 70 | 55 |
| Energy storage | 85 | 80 |
| Transport | 65 | 50 |
| Buildings | 72 | 58 |
| Industry | 60 | 44 |
| Energy intensity | 54 | 40 |
| Low-carbon fuels | 48 | 32 |
| Non-energy | ||
| Deforestation | 28 | 22 |
| Dietary change | 20 | 15 |
| Reforestation | 30 | 22 |
| Carbon capture | 48 | 35 |
| Enablers | ||
| Commitments | 78 | 70 |
| Investment | 72 | 55 |
| Carbon pricing | 55 | 38 |
80+ = on track · 60–79 = below required pace · Below 60 = off track. Sub-scores inform composite scores where multiple data series apply. Source: Perigon Partners analysis, January 2026.
Primary sources and impartial review.
Every data point in the LCTI comes from a named primary source. The index is entirely independent.
Further methodology details can be found in the index explorer.
Primary sources only
Data from IEA, IRENA, BloombergNEF, SBTi, Oxford Climate Policy Monitor, TPI, WRI and others.
Performance assessment
Each indicator scored on annual trend (40% weighting) and performance relative to that required by IEA STEPS and IEA Net Zero scenarios (60%).
Updated annually
Published each year with consistent fourteen indicators, building a citable year-on-year dataset. First established in 2025.
No politics
The LCTI describes what the data shows. Perigon does not advocate for specific policies. We report on what is happening and what the gap is.